Dying Declaration Under Section 26(a) of the BSA
Vaidehi Sharma
Why It Matters?
A dying declaration is a statutory exception to the rule against hearsay that allows a deceased person's statement concerning the cause of their death or the circumstances of the transaction resulting in death to be considered as relevant evidence. Under Section 26(a) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, this principle continues the framework previously contained in Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Its significance lies in preserving the victim's account when their death makes ordinary testimony and cross-examination impossible.
An important feature of Indian law is that the declarant need not have believed death was imminent when making the statement. This distinguishes the Indian position from the approach traditionally adopted in English and American evidence law. The declaration may be oral, written or communicated through gestures, provided its contents and circumstances satisfy the applicable legal requirements.
However, admissibility does not automatically establish reliability. Courts must examine whether the statement was voluntary, truthful, coherent and free from tutoring or influence. A credible dying declaration can independently support a conviction without corroboration, but its circumstances must be carefully scrutinised.
The continuing challenge is to strengthen the recording process through consistent safeguards, including audio-visual documentation and clearer procedural standards. Such measures could improve authenticity and reliability while preserving the evidentiary value of this important exception.\
ABSTRACT
A dying declaration is one of the oldest and most debated exceptions to the rule against hearsay in the law of evidence. Grounded in the belief that a person facing death is unlikely to lie, it allows a deceased person's own account of the cause of their death to be placed before a court that can never hear them testify. This article traces the statutory basis of dying declarations in India, from Section 32(1) of the now-repealed Indian Evidence Act, 1872 to its successor, Section 26(a) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023. It examines the essential conditions for admissibility, corrects a common misconception regarding the requirement of imminent death, surveys the leading judicial precedents, undertakes a brief comparative study, and critically evaluates the continuing procedural gaps in how such declarations are recorded in practice.
Keywords: dying declaration; Section 32 Indian Evidence Act; Section 26 Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam; hearsay exception; criminal evidence.
I. INTRODUCTION
The law generally distrusts hearsay – an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of what it asserts – because the person who made it cannot be cross-examined. A dying declaration is a striking exception to this rule. It rests on the Latin maxim nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire, meaning that a person will not meet their maker with a lie on their lips. In legal terms, it refers to a statement made by a person as to the cause of their death, or the circumstances of the transaction that resulted in their death, where the person is unavailable to testify because they have since died.
For nearly one hundred and fifty years, this exception was governed in India by Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. With effect from 1 July 2024, the Evidence Act stands repealed and replaced by the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (“BSA”), and the provision on dying declarations now finds its place in Section 26(a) of the BSA, which reproduces the substance of the earlier provision almost verbatim. Because the language and structure of the two provisions are near-identical, the substantial body of judicial interpretation built up under Section 32(1) continues to apply with full force under Section 26(a). This article examines that statutory scheme, its essential conditions, a recurring misconception about what those conditions actually require, the leading judicial precedents (including a Supreme Court ruling as recent as December 2025), a brief comparative note, and the procedural gaps that continue to affect the reliability of dying declarations in practice.
II. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK: FROM SECTION 32(1) OF THE EVIDENCE ACT TO SECTION 26(a) OF THE BSA
Both provisions render relevant a statement, whether oral or written, made by a person as to the cause of their death or as to any circumstance of the transaction which resulted in their death, in any proceeding – civil or criminal – in which the cause of that person's death comes into question. Two features of this wording deserve emphasis, since they are frequently glossed over in student writing on the subject. First, the provision is not confined to criminal trials; it applies equally where the cause of death arises in a civil proceeding, such as a suit on a life insurance policy. Second, the statement is relevant only where the cause of that person's death is itself in question in the proceeding – a statement about an unrelated matter, made by a person who later happens to die, does not become a dying declaration merely because the maker is deceased.
III. ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS AND A COMMON MISCONCEPTION
Drawing on the statutory text and judicial interpretation, a statement will be treated as a dying declaration where: (a) it relates to the cause of death or to the circumstances of the transaction resulting in death; (b) the maker has since died, since a surviving declarant's statement is treated as an ordinary statement subject to cross-examination rather than as a dying declaration; (c) the death in question must be shown to have resulted from the very injuries or circumstances described in the statement, and not from an unconnected cause – in Moti Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh, the Supreme Court held a dying declaration inadmissible where the prosecution failed to establish that the declarant's eventual death, occurring some weeks later, was in fact attributable to the injuries described in the statement; and (d) the statement must be coherent and complete enough to convey the declarant's intended meaning, since a statement cut short by death before it is finished may be excluded if the court cannot be certain what the declarant meant to say.
A persistent misconception, repeated in a great deal of student and even practitioner writing on this subject, is that Indian law requires the declarant to have been under a settled expectation of imminent death at the time of making the statement, mirroring the English common law position. This is incorrect. The statutory text of both Section 32(1) and Section 26(a) contains no such requirement, and the Supreme Court has repeatedly confirmed that a statement does not cease to be a dying declaration merely because the declarant did not, at the time of making it, believe death to be imminent. This position was most recently reaffirmed in December 2025, when the Supreme Court, while restoring summons against additional accused in a case concerning the fatal shooting of a woman, held that a statement recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 does not lose its character as a dying declaration merely because a substantial period elapsed between the statement and the declarant's eventual death, and that neither Section 32(1) of the erstwhile Evidence Act nor its successor imposes any requirement that the declarant expected death to be imminent. This is precisely the point at which Indian law departs most sharply from the position in England and the United States, discussed further below.
IV. MODE AND MANNER OF RECORDING
No particular form is prescribed for recording a dying declaration. In Queen-Empress v Abdullah, the declarant, whose throat had been slit, was unable to speak but identified her assailant by pointing at him; the Allahabad High Court held that a dying declaration may be made orally, in writing, or through gestures and signs, and that there is no rule confining it to a particular mode of communication. While recording by a Magistrate is the preferred and most reliable practice, the Supreme Court has clarified that this is not mandatory: a statement recorded by a police officer under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 may equally qualify as a dying declaration once the maker dies, and the absence of a Magistrate's presence or a doctor's certificate as to the declarant's mental fitness does not, by itself, render the statement inadmissible. Modern courts have also accepted audio and video recordings of dying declarations, though no statute in India presently mandates such recording as a matter of course.
V. EVIDENTIARY VALUE AND JUDICIAL SAFEGUARDS
A dying declaration, if found to be voluntary, truthful, and free from tutoring, may by itself form the sole basis of conviction without independent corroboration. In Khushal Rao v State of Bombay, the Supreme Court held that the supposed rule against relying solely on an uncorroborated dying declaration is a matter of judicial caution rather than an inflexible rule of law, and that a dying declaration recorded in accordance with proper procedure and found credible by the court may sustain a conviction on its own. This position was reiterated in Munnu Raja v State of Madhya Pradesh, where the Court clarified that there is neither a rule of law nor a rule of prudence requiring corroboration of a dying declaration once the court is satisfied that it is true and voluntary. Where a declarant makes more than one statement before death, courts examine whether the successive versions are consistent with one another before placing reliance on them, and a statement recorded by a Magistrate is generally treated as carrying the greatest evidentiary weight, though the Supreme Court in Laxman v State of Maharashtra clarified that neither a Magistrate's recording nor a doctor's certificate of fitness is an indispensable legal requirement, provided the court is otherwise satisfied that the declarant was of sound and coherent mind.
VI. A COMPARATIVE NOTE
United Kingdom: the admissibility of a dying declaration under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 remains largely confined to homicide and continues to require that the declarant held a settled, hopeless expectation of death at the time of making the statement.
United States: Rule 804(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Evidence extends the exception to both civil and criminal proceedings, but likewise conditions admissibility on the declarant's belief that death was imminent.
Canada: Canadian courts have generally required that a dying declaration be made spontaneously and free from leading questions before it will be admitted.
Set against this backdrop, Indian law is markedly more expansive: it dispenses with any requirement that the declarant subjectively believed death was imminent, and it extends to both civil and criminal proceedings alike. This breadth serves a genuine protective purpose – particularly in dowry-death and domestic-violence cases where a victim's own account may be the only direct evidence of what occurred inside a household – but it correspondingly places a greater burden on courts to scrutinise the circumstances in which each declaration was recorded.
VII. CHALLENGES AND CRITICAL EVALUATION
The expansiveness of India’s approach is not without drawbacks. Dying declarations remain susceptible to manipulation and coaching, a danger particularly evident in prosecutions concerning matrimonial disputes and dowry deaths, where relatives of the deceased may be present during the recording and possess vested interests in its content; a concrete example arose in a case where a wife’s statement, later treated as a dying declaration, became the foundation of a prosecution under Sections 304‑B and 498‑A of the Indian Penal Code for dowry death. Since the declarant cannot be subjected to cross‑examination, the defence lacks any mechanism to test the statement’s reliability at the time of its making, which explains why courts emphasise rigorous scrutiny of the recording circumstances rather than treating a dying declaration as conclusively binding. A further, more systemic deficiency is that neither the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 nor the related procedural codes presently require audio‑visual recording of dying declarations, despite the fact that such technology is now widely and inexpensively accessible even at local police stations and primary health centres. Scholars have therefore urged adoption of a standard operating procedure mandating audio‑video recording wherever feasible, uniform directions for doctors and police officers on certifying a declarant’s mental fitness, and a centralised digital repository of recorded declarations to minimise disputes about authenticity and tampering. The BSA’s re‑enactment of substantive law, without addressing this procedural lacuna, signifies a missed opportunity to reinforce the credibility of a form of evidence that, by its very nature, cannot be tested through cross‑examination.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of dying declaration continues to be both theoretically sound and practically indispensable as an exception to the hearsay rule, permitting a victim’s words to speak when they themselves cannot. Its migration from Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 to Section 26(a) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 retains, without alteration, nearly a century of judicial exposition, including the firmly established yet often misunderstood principle that Indian law, unlike English and American jurisprudence, does not require the declarant to apprehend death as imminent. What the legislative re‑enactment has failed to address is the procedural lacuna surrounding the manner of recording such declarations. A move towards compulsory audio‑visual documentation and standardised practice, rather than reliance solely upon judicial caution, would significantly reinforce a category of evidence whose maker can never be subjected to cross‑examination, and whose credibility is precisely the reason it has always carried such enduring importance.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Legislation
Indian Evidence Act 1872 (repealed)
Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam 2023
Code of Criminal Procedure 1973
Criminal Justice Act 2003 (UK)
Federal Rules of Evidence 1975 (US)
Cases
Pakala Narayan Swami v Emperor, AIR 1939 PC 47
Queen-Empress v Abdullah (1885) ILR 7 All 385
Moti Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1964 SC 900
Khushal Rao v State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 22
Munnu Raja v State of Madhya Pradesh (1976) 3 SCC 104
Rattan Singh v State of Himachal Pradesh (1997) 4 SCC 161
Kulwant Singh v State of Punjab (2004) 9 SCC 257
Laxman v State of Maharashtra (2002) 6 SCC 710
Satish Chandra v State of Madhya Pradesh (2014) 6 SCC 723
Neeraj Kumar alias Neeraj Yadav v State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1171
R v B (K) [1993] 1 SCR 627
Secondary Sources
Justice A V. Chandrashekar, ‘Dying Declaration – Its Applicability in Criminal Case’, Journal of the Karnataka Judicial Academy
Dr Onkar Nath Tiwari, ‘Cogency of Dying Declaration: Analysis’, ILI Law Review (Summer Issue, 2018)
Author(s): Prarthna Soni
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