Case Brief: Archita v. Sunil Seth

Case Details	Information
Name of the Case	Archita v. Sunil Seth
Citation	AIR Online 2019 Del 50; 2019(2) Criminal CC 243; 2019:DHC:212; 256(2019) DLT 659; 2019(1) JCC 383; MANU/DE/0090/2019
Date of Judgement	January 11, 2019
Petitioner	Archita (Wife)
Respondent	Sunil Seth (Husband)
Bench/Judges	Justice Sanjeev Sachdeva
STATUTES INVOLVED	- Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973<br>- Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955<br>- Indian Majority Act, 1875
IMPORTANT PRINCIPLES/DOCTRINES	- Maintenance rights of divorced women<br>- Distinction between maintenance as wife and as divorced woman<br>- Desertion as ground for divorce

FACTS OF THE CASE

The parties were having quarrels within a short period of marriage, and the parties started living separately from April 3, 2004. Both parties filed matrimonial proceedings, and the petitioner filed an application under Section 125 Cr.P.C. for interim maintenance in 2007.

A decree for divorce was passed on March 12, 2015, on the petition of the respondent-husband on the grounds of cruelty and desertion. The decree was upheld up to the Supreme Court. The petition under Section 125 Cr.P.C. filed by the petitioner was dismissed by the trial court on May 7, 2015, primarily on the grounds that no reasonable ground established by the petitioner for living apart.

ISSUES INVOLVED

1. Whether the trial court was correct in dismissing the application under Section 125 Cr.P.C. on the ground that there was no sufficient cause for the petitioner to live separately?
2. Whether a wife who has been divorced on the ground of desertion is entitled to maintenance for the period prior to the decree of divorce?
3. What are the maintenance rights of a divorced woman under Section 125 Cr.P.C.?

ARGUMENTS FROM THE PETITIONER'S SIDE

• The petitioner contended that the trial court erred in dismissing the application under Section 125 Cr.P.C. on the ground that there was no sufficient cause for living separately.
• The petitioner challenged the judgment dated May 7, 2015, whereby her maintenance application was dismissed.

ARGUMENTS FROM THE RESPONDENT'S SIDE

• The respondent argued that since the decree of divorce was passed on the ground of desertion, the finding of the trial court dismissing the application under Section 125 Cr.P.C. was unassailable.
• The respondent relied on the fact that the divorce decree had been upheld up to the Supreme Court.

JUDGEMENT PRONOUNCED

The High Court of Delhi, relying on the Supreme Court decision in Rohtash Singh v. Ramendri & Ors. (2000) 3 SCC 180, held that:

1. No maintenance for pre-divorce period: Since the decree of divorce was passed on the ground of desertion on March 12, 2015, and was upheld up to the Supreme Court, the petitioner was clearly disentitled to maintenance for the period prior to the passing of the decree of divorce.
2. Distinct rights for maintenance: The Court recognized that a woman has two distinct rights for maintenance:
   • As a wife, she is entitled to maintenance unless she suffers from disabilities indicated in Section 125(4) Cr.P.C.
   • As a divorced woman, she is entitled to claim maintenance from her former husband
3. Post-divorce maintenance rights: The Court clarified that the petitioner would be entitled to file and maintain an application under Section 125 Cr.P.C. for the period post the decree of divorce (i.e., post March 12, 2015), provided she could satisfy the condition of Section 125(1)(a) Cr.P.C. that she is unable to maintain herself.
4. Upholding trial court's decision: The Court found no infirmity in the trial court's view of rejecting the application under Section 125 Cr.P.C.

CONCLUSION

The thrust of this judgment is to work out the rights of maintenance of divorced women under Section 125 Cr.P.C., particularly in cases where divorce is granted on the ground of desertion. It is to be understood that the Court has held that a woman divorced on grounds of desertion cannot seek maintenance for the pre-divorce period but can maintain proceedings for maintenance as a divorced woman for the post-divorce period, having to prove that she is unable to maintain herself. Thus a divorce does not put an end to maintenance; it only converts the nature of the right from maintenance as a wife to maintenance as a divorced woman.