Union of India v. Popular Construction Co., (2001) 8SCC 470

CITATION: AIR 2001 SUPREME COURT 4010 

Petitioner: Union of India  

Respondent: Popular Construction Co.  

Date of Judgement: 05/10/2001 

Bench: Ruma Pal, G.B. Pattanaik  

FACTS AND BACKGROUND OF THE CASE 

On August 29, 1998, the arbitrator in this dispute rendered an award. The arbitrator sent the  original award to the appellant, believing that the Arbitration Act, 1940 applied, along with a  request to file the award in the Bombay High Court so that a decree may be issued in accordance  with the rules of the Arbitration Act, 1940. The appellant filed the Award in the Bombay High  Court on March 29, 1999. On April 19, 1999, the appellant submitted an application under  Section 30 read with Section 16 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 contesting the Award. 

"Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996" was then substituted for "Arbitration Act, 1940" in  the modified application. On October 26, 1999, the learned Single Judge dismissed the  application, citing Section 34 of the 1996 Act's statute of limitations. The Division Bench  upheld the learned Single Judge's conclusions and denied the appeal. 

The appellant has not refuted the argument that its complaint to the Award was time barred and  the appeal would have to be dismissed if the Limitation Act, 1963, and specifically Section 5,  did not apply to Section 34 of the 1996 Act. However, it is argued that there was adequate justification for the delay in filing the application under Section 34 and that Section 29(2) of  the Limitation Act applies the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to special laws like  the 1996 Act since the 1996 Act did not specifically exclude its applicability. 

On the other hand, the respondent's attorney has argued that Section 34's language clearly  excluded the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, and as a result, there was no room  to evaluate whether the reason for the delay was adequate after the time frame specified in the  proviso to Section 34. 

ISSUES INVOLVED 

1. Whether the requirements of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 apply to an  application contesting an award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation  Act, 1996 (henceforth referred to as the "1996 Act") is the question that needs to be  decided in this case. 

2. The arbitrator rendered the decision in this matter on August 29, 1998. The arbitrator  sent the original award to the appellant with a request to file it in the Bombay High Court so that a decree may be made in accordance with the terms of the award under  the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940, believing that the Arbitration Act, 1940  applied. On March 29, 1999, the appellant submitted the award with the Bombay High  Court. On April 19, 1999, the appellant submitted an application under Section 30 read  with Section 16 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 contesting the Award. The phrase  "Arbitration Act, 1940" was then changed to "Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996"  in the application. On October 26, 1999, the learned Single Judge rejected the  application on the grounds that it was barred by limitation under Section 34 of the 1996  Act. The Division Bench dismissed the appeal and maintained the learned Single  Judge's conclusions. 

ARGUMENTS FROM PETITIONERS SIDE 

1. The appellant has not refuted the argument that its complaint to the Award was time  barred and the appeal would have to be dismissed if the Limitation Act, 1963, and  specifically Section 5, did not apply to Section 34 of the 1996 Act. However, it is argued that there was adequate justification for the delay in filing the application under Section  34 and that Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act applies the provisions of Section 5 of  the Limitation Act to special laws like the 1996 Act since the 1996 Act did not  specifically exclude its applicability. 

2. On the other hand, the respondent's attorney has argued that Section 34's language  clearly excluded the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, and as a result, there  was no room to evaluate whether the reason for the delay was adequate after the time frame specified in the proviso to Section 34. 

JUDGEMENT  

In the circumstances and for the reasons earlier stated, we answer the question posed at the outset in the negative. The appeal is accordingly dismissed without any Order as to costs.

Author(s): Riya Rao, intern at The Legal Lock, a 3rd year LLB student at G.D. Goenka University.