CASE BRIEF: B.P. SINGHAL VS UNION OF INDIA &ANR, 20110 (6) SCC 331

 

CASE NAME	B.P. Singhal vs. Union Of India &Anr
CITATION	2010 (4) AWC 3617 (SC)
COURT	The Supreme Court of India.
BENCH	Hon’ble Justice P Sathasivam, Justice B Sudershan Reddy, Justice R V Raveendran, Justice S H Kapadia, Justice K G Balakrishnan
PETITIONER	B.P. Singhal
RESPONDENTS	Union of India &Anr.
DECIDED ON	Decided on 7 May, 2010

INTRODUCTION

The case of ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla has yielded a contradictory legacy in the realm of Indian constitutional law. The majority ruling, which was sometimes referred to as the "darkest hour" of the Supreme Court, was attributed to the fact that it failed to protect civil freedoms and judicial independence during the emergency that occurred between 1975 and 1977. On the other hand, Justice H.R. Khanna presented an alternate viewpoint that provided a robust defense of fundamental liberties. This case brought to light the importance of having checks and balances on the authority of the president, as well as the potential for emergency powers to be abused. After the Emergency was declared over, reforms were implemented that improved judicial review and rights protections. However, despite the fact that it is no longer a case that is relevant, it is still a cautionary tale about the dangers of abandoning fundamental values.

FACTS

As a result of the recommendation made by the Council of Ministers, the Governors of Goa, Gujarat, Haryana, and Uttar Pradesh were dismissed from their positions on July 2, 2004 by the President of India. As a consequence of this, a writ petition in the form of a Public Interest Litigation was submitted, which asked for the reinstatement of the Governors of the States that were named earlier. According to Articles 155 and 156 of The Constitution of India, 1949, a Governor of a State is appointed by the President of India and serves "during the pleasure of the President." This arrangement is in accordance with the Constitution of India. The majority of the time, a governor is only allowed to serve for a maximum of five years in office. On the other hand, Article 74 mandates that the President must take action based on the recommendations of the Council and the evidence that led to the removal of the Governors. Second, a Writ of Certiorari was submitted, which demanded that the same order be overturned. Additionally, a Writ of Mandamus was submitted, which suggested that ministers be removed from their positions. This would allow the Governor to continue serving in office in accordance with the wishes of the Central Government that was currently in power. In this particular instance, the petitioner initially sought that the documents be produced, and then they continued their demands by requesting that the four Governors be allowed to finish the remaining five years of their terms. This particular case was heard by a constitutional bench consisting of four judges from India's Supreme Court. 

ISSUE RAISED

1. Is the petition that was filed before the Court maintainable?
2. What does the 'Doctrine of Pleasure' mean in the Indian Constitution of 1949?
3. How does a Governor function under the Indian Constitution of 1949?
4. Are there any specific constraints or limitations on Article 156 clause (1) of the Constitution of India, 1949?
5. What is the scope of judicial review in the event that the President's pleasure is revoked?

PETITIONER'S ARGUMENTS

1. The petitioner has put forward the following constitutional parameters prior to the removal of a Governor from office:

1. The removal of the petitioner should only be carried out in exceptional and uncommon situations, such as physical or mental incompetence, corruption, Constitutional breaches, or misconduct. The dismissal of the Governor cannot be predicated upon the ideology or preferences with which they are affiliated.
2. In the absence of a formal notice of termination, it is imperative to inform the Governor of the grounds for their departure.
3. In a democratic system such as India, no public authority has unrestricted or unchecked power, regardless of their position in the administrative hierarchy. Premature removals should be subject to judicial examination in order to uphold genuine democracy.

1. Furthermore, the petitioner said that when a Governor is confronted with an early dismissal from office, they should be notified of the grounds for the dismissal and provided with a chance to present their case.
2. In addition, the petitioner suggested that the principles of natural justice be taken into account and that the Governor be provided with a show-cause notice that clearly sets out the grounds for their termination.
3. Furthermore, it was argued that the acceptance of the Doctrine of Pleasure could only be supported after a thorough judicial scrutiny.

RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENTS

• The respondent argued that the dismissal of the Governor is not legally justified by presenting two reasons:

1. Under Article 156(1) of the Indian constitution, the President possesses unrestricted and exclusive authority to dismiss any Governor. The five-year term permitted by Article 156 (3) of the Constitution of India, 1949, is contingent upon the provisions of Article 156 (4) of the same constitution. (1). Given that the Doctrine of Pleasure is unfettered by The Constitution of India, 1949, any endeavor to restrict it would be deemed unconstitutional.
2. Furthermore, Article 74(2) of the Constitution of India, 1949 explicitly prohibits any court from intervening in any recommendation given by the council of ministers. 
3. According to his statement, the Governors who were removed from their positions by the President's order of 02/07/2004 did not express any opposition to it, therefore preventing any member of the general public from initiating a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) to reinstate them under their roles.
4. Furthermore, it was contended that a Governor may be appointed only at the President's discretion, therefore enabling the President or the Union Government to dismiss him at any point during his five-year tenure without providing any justification or explanation.
5. In addition, it was said that the framers of the Indian Constitution granted the President the authority to dismiss a Governor in the event that he lost confidence in him.
6. The knowledgeable attorney general observed that although the removal should be carried out with a discernible objective, it was not imperative to notify the Governor of that rationale.
7. Furthermore, it was argued that the 'Doctrine of Pleasure' does not have to be used in reaction to any wrongdoing by the Governor, but rather if the President believes that the Governor is incapable of continuing in their elected office for whatever reason.
8. The respondent also contended that in a democratic society such as India, it is imperative for the ruling government to dismiss a Governor who deviates from the policies and ideologies espoused by the constituents of the ruling political party.

JUDGEMENT

The honorable judges of the Supreme Court held that:

1. 1. The petition could be allowed on the grounds of it being of importance to the public as to the scope of Article 156(1) but not because of the reason to provide relief to the individual Governors of the states, namely Goa, Gujarat, Haryana and Uttar Pradesh which the President removed.
   2. The court states that the Doctrine of Pleasure cannot be applied as an unrestricted or absolute provision of law. The court referred to Article 310 (2) and Article 311, clause (1) and clause (2) of The Constitution of India, 1949, and it was condemned that even in these articles of The Indian Constitution, the application of the doctrine is not wholly unrestricted. 
   3.  The court referred to articles 156 (1), 156 (3), 310, and 311 of The Constitution of India, 1949. The court then went on to proceed to explain the meaning of Article 156 of The Constitution, which shows that the President appoints the Governor and shall continue to remain in the office at the pleasure of the President. The court then laid down a nexus between Article 156 clause (1) and 156 clause (3) of The Indian Constitution, 1949, and stated that clause (3) doesn’t place any restrictions upon clause (1) of the same provision. 

• The removal of the Governor, even if it comes without the compulsion of disclosing the reasons for such removal, requires that the removal should be done based on justifiable and valid reasons in a reasonable manner. So therefore, the burden of proof would lie upon the aggrieved to prove that his removal was a prima facie instance of arbitrariness and mala fide, as the court, upon the withdrawal of the pleasure, would automatically go on to assume that it was done on the basis of compelling reasons.  

CONCLUSION 

The constitution bench, while summarizing the Judgment, put the following points forward:

•  As per article 156(1) of the Indian constitution,1949, a Governor can be removed by the President at any point in time without the President providing the Governor with any reason for the same because the Governor is supposed to hold and run his or her office during the pleasure of the President. 

• Even though the President isn’t required to assign a reason for withdrawing his pleasure at any given point, as given under Article 156 clause (1), the removal of the Governor cannot be based on arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable grounds. The removal can only be done, if it is a premature one and only in rare and exceptional scenarios under valid and justified reasons and grounds. The court further stated that the scope of these compelling reasons is not limited to disability, corruption, or misbehavior, but rather, it is much more widely based depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case in question.

• A Governor cannot be eliminated based solely on the reason that the Central Government has changed and the new government has come into power, which doesn’t associate with the Governor in power, so the current Governor is removed from his post to make way for a more favorable candidate. Moreover, a governor can not be removed because he is not in sync with the ideologies and policies followed by the central government, and he cannot be removed on the grounds that the union of ministers has lost confidence in him or her. 

As the reasons aren’t required to be conveyed to the Governors for any removals that are made, the withdrawal of pleasure would be assumed to be valid and well-grounded. This, in turn, would also limit the scope of the judicial review to a great extent, making the passage for the review too narrow. In any case, for that matter only, and only if the aggrieved party is able to establish prima facie evidence of the fact that his or her removal, which was so made was arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, and/or mala fide, will the court(s) have the authority to direct the production of materials which might have formed the basis of the decision to withdraw Doctrine of Pleasure by the President, under the direction of the Union Government or not, be taken. If the Union Government doesn't uncover any explanation, or if the reasons unveiled are seen as insignificant, subjective, eccentric, or mala fide, the Court will have the right to intervene. This, if broken down into easy terms, only means that in any case, the Court won't intervene simply on the grounds that an alternate perspective is conceivable or that the material or reasons are inadequate.