CASE BRIEF: EPURU SUDHAKAR & ANR VS GOVT. OF A.P. & ORS  2006 (8) SCC 161

CASE NAME	Epuru Sudhakar & Anr vs. Govt. Of A.P. & Ors.  2006 (8) SCC 161
CITATION	AIR 2006 SC 3385, 2006 AIR SCW 5089, 2006 (5) ALL LJ EE 605, 2006 (6) AIR BOM R 439, (2007) 1 EASTCRIC 97, (2007) 1 DLT(CRL) 228
COURT	The Supreme Court of India.
BENCH	Hon’ble Justice Arijit Pasayat
PETITIONERS	Epuru Sudhakar & Anr.
RESPONDENT	Govt. of A.P. & Ors.
DECIDED ON	decided on 11th October, 2006

INTRODUCTION

Article 72 of the Indian Constitution requires a plea for mercy be submitted to the president before a pardon can be granted. First, the home ministry considers this petition in cooperation with the relevant state government. The petition is forwarded to the president following the home minister's recommendations. The Constitution includes the authority to pardon. According to Article 72 of the Constitution, the President may pardon, reprieve, respite, or remit punishment and suspend, remit, or commute the sentence of any individual found guilty of any crime. The Council of Ministers would prevent misuse. Similarly, the state governor may use the same authority under Article 161 of the Constitution against anyone found guilty of any offense against any law relating to matters to which the executive power of the state. The Governor, who the Indian President chooses, serves as the official head of state administration. The Indian Constitution bestows various authorities upon the governor, broadly classified as executive, legislative, financial, and judicial. One of the governor's judicial functions is the ability to pardon. The suspension of the sentences and their execution will support the promotion of public welfare, which is the main goal of all penalties. This is the foundation upon which the pardoning authority is to be applied. The Governor's ability to pardon a convict under Article 161 of the Indian Constitution is a constitutional duty, not a right or privilege. It is comparable to the President's authority under Article 72 of the Indian Constitution in many respects. 

FACTS OF THE CASE

Petitioner No. 1 is the son of the deceased Sh. Epuru Chinna Ramasubbaiah, who was murdered on October 19, 1995, along with another individual. Petitioner No. 2 alleges to be the son of the late Sh. Tirupati Reddy, who was slain by respondent No. 2 while he was being held on bail in connection with petitioner No. 1's father's murder. The murder petition was rejected. Regarding a few other sentences, the conviction was upheld. The respondent No. 3 wife of respondent No. 2 submitted a representation on 28.5.2003, and on 18.10.2003, parole was granted for a period of 15 days. However, the State Government revoked the parole on 30.10.2003, citing the report by the Superintendent of Police, Kurnool. Respondent No. 3 ran in the Andhra Pradesh Assembly Election and was elected to the Legislative Assembly on May 12, 2004. She submitted a request for respondent No. 2's parole on May 14, 2004. The same was approved on May 19, 2004, and periodically renewed. On July 18, 2004, a fourth, fifteen-day extension was approved. Respondent No. 3 represented Respondent No. 1 on October 10, 2004, requesting a pardon for Respondent No. 2, citing his involvement in fake cases due to political rivalry and exercising power under Article 161 of the Constitution. While the pardon petition was pending on October 18, 2004, a one-month parole period was granted. On 11.8.2005, the Andhra Pradesh Governor allegedly used his authority under Article 161 of the Constitution to pardon Respondent No. 2's unexpired sentence. The Superintendent of Central Prison, Cherlapally, R.R. District, ordered the release of Respondent No. 2 on 12.8.2005. The Director General and Inspector General of Police (Correction Services), Andhra Pradesh, were instructed to initiate action for the release of Respondent No. 2. The writ petition was filed, among other things, claiming that the contested order was given without using due process, that the appropriate materials were not presented to the governor, and that the remission—which the writ petition refers to as a pardon—was unlawfully granted.

ISSUES RAISED

1. Is it possible for court review to take precedence over the pardon granted by the president? 
2. How much authority does the president or governor have to pardon people? Is this an unrestricted power? 
3. What are the possible restrictions on this power? 
4. What obligations do the president or governor have under the Indian Constitution while using this pardoning power?

ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF BOTH SIDES

Arguments from the side of the petitioner

• Pardons are given on the grounds that the offender has realized his mistakes, that society will not benefit from his continued incarceration, and that he will behave honorably and in accordance with the law going forward.
• Because the pertinent documents were not provided to the governor and the contentious order was adopted while under consideration, the congressional activist who was found guilty by the then-Andhra Pradesh governor, Sushil Kumar Shinde, was not entitled to sentencing immunity.

Arguments from the side of the respondent

• A political resentment led to the creation of the petition. The Governor, a high constitutional authority, considered all pertinent information before issuing the remission order. It is argued that the petitioner did not understand the difference between a pardon and a sentence reduction. This Court shouldn't become involved in the case because there were sufficient reasons to grant the remission. The writ petition ought to be denied, given the narrow parameters of judicial review.
• Although this Court had suggested some recommended guidelines in Maru Ram v. Union of India & Others, Kehar Singh and Others v. Union of India and Another did not accept the same. Actually, the purported discrepancies in the opinion were emphasized in a subsequent ruling in Ashok Kumar @ Golu v. Union of India and Ors., when a three-judge bench concluded that setting forth rules would be improper.

JUDGMENT

The Supreme Court ruled that the High Court and the Supreme Court have the authority to conduct a limited judicial review of the use of clemency powers. Judicial review applies to the authority vested in the president and governor by articles 72 and 161. Additionally, it was decided that the High Court might overturn the governor's pardoning authority if it was used for political, caste, or religious reasons. If the President or Governor grants clemency, it may be contested because it was issued arbitrarily, with no good reason given, or with irrelevant or superfluous reasons excluded. 

CONCLUSION

One common illustration of how law changes through judicial interpretation is the courts' evaluation of the pardoning authority. After extreme resistance to even look at the matter, the inclination has shifted to a more moderate and middle-of-the-road strategy. The majority of the courts have concurred with the ruling in Maru Ram's case and the limitations imposed by it, which explains their function in review cases. Everyone agrees that the court cannot consider the decision's merits unless there is evidence of arbitrariness, malice, or ignorance of certain material facts.  Such circumstances are considered anomalies, even when the courts have stepped beyond the thin line that restricts the scope of their examination, as stated in Maru Ram's case. Since the Court has barely strayed from the path laid down in the Maru Ram ruling, these should be disregarded.  Thus, in the words of Pathak, C.J., "there can be no attributes more important than the life and personal liberty of its members"[11], and one such function that ensures this is the pardoning authority of the President and Governor. Therefore, this authority is a fundamental and important feature of the Constitution, and it is hoped that those who hold it will exercise it in a fair and unbiased manner, with the judiciary continuing to serve as a watchdog in these situations. Judge Passayat acknowledged the opinion of renowned academic lawyer Sir William Wade and confirmed that the broad definition of Article 72 does not provide precise conditions for exercising this authority because of particular facts and situations. Instance.  On the other hand, the idea that power should be used responsibly should mesh well with the principle that the court shouldn't assume the president's pardoning powers. True discretion can only be exercised by the president within the parameters of legal rationality. If you transgress these limitations, kindly take extreme measures. The court will only intervene and give judicial review under specific circumstances. Reviewing the legal principles in light of the circumstances made it apparent that superfluous and needless elements had entered the decision-making process, so tainting it. The remission order being contested in the petition is reversed since it is blatantly unreasonable. Respondent No. 1 may, nevertheless, handle the petition as pending in order to give it another look. In order to determine the pertinent criteria otherwise, the Governor may take notice of papers presented to him by State authorities and conduct any further inquiry he thinks appropriate.