CASE BRIEF: INDEPENDENT THOUGHT v. UNION OF INDIA, (2017) 10 SCC 800

 

CASE NAME	Independent Thought v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 800
CITATION	AIR 2017 SUPREME COURT 4904, AIR 2018 SC (CRIMINAL) 229, (2017) 12 SCALE 621, (2017) 4 CURCRIR 54, (2017) 4 KER LJ 11, 2017 (4) KLT SN 42 (SC)
COURT	Supreme Court of India
BENCH	Hon’ble Justice Madan B. Lokur and Justice Deepak Gupta
PETITIONER	Independent Thought
RESPONDENT	Union of India and Another
DECIDED ON	11th October 2017

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court of India rendered a historic ruling in the matter of Independent Thought v. Union of India on October 11, 2017, addressing the relationship between criminal law, constitutional morality, and children's rights. Independent Thought, a non-governmental group devoted to children's welfare, filed a public interest litigation (PIL) that gave rise to the case. The Court's main concern was whether Exception 2 to Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which excused marital rape of a wife between the ages of 15 and 18 from being considered rape, was constitutional. The petitioner contended that the exemption violated the Protection of Children from Sexual Offenses (POCSO) Act, 2012, as well as Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Constitution, which provide equality, dignity, and protection from exploitation. It was argued that by essentially approving child marriage and allowing sexual exploitation in such relationships, this exception infringed upon the rights of young girls. In its ruling, the Court reconciled the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act of 2006 and the POCSO Act with the provisions of the IPC. It declared that the exception infringed on the female child's fundamental rights by permitting sexual relations with a wife who was between the ages of 15 and 18. The Court underlined that minor girls cannot be subjected to non-consensual sexual actions and have equal legal protection under the law, regardless of their marital status. This ruling was a major step toward advancing gender equality and protecting children's rights. It also established a precedent for the progressive interpretation of laws impacting vulnerable groups by highlighting the necessity of uniform legal standards in addressing child abuse and exploitation.

FACTS OF THE CASE

The petitioner, a society registered on August 6, 2009, has been involved in child rights activity ever since. In a number of Indian states, the society offers non-governmental groups, as well as governmental and multinational entities, technical and handholding support. Additionally, it has conducted research, provided training, and intervened in court on matters pertaining to children's rights. In the public interest, the society has filed a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution to highlight the rights violations of girls married between the ages of 15 and 18. W.P. (C) No. 382 of 2013 Page 2. 

ISSUES RAISED

• Is it rape when a man and his wife, who is a girl between the ages of 15 and 18, engage in sexual activity?
• Whether exception to section 375 of IPC is violative of Fundamental Rights and unconstitutional?

ARGUMENTS FROM BOTH SIDES

Arguments on behalf of the Petitioner

• The petitioner's learned counsel argued that granting a girl child between the ages of 15 and 18 the right to engage in non-consensual sexual relations with her accomplishes nothing at all. Additionally, it was argued that the married status of a female child between the ages of 15 and 18 has no logical connection to the (uncertain) goal that W.P. (C) No. 382 of 2013 Page 3 aims to accomplish. 
• Furthermore, just because a girl between the ages of 15 and 18 marries does not mean that she no longer qualifies as a minor or that she is physically or psychologically capable of engaging in any kind of sexual activity or conjugal relations. 
• According to the argument, Exception 2 to Section 375 of the IPC is discriminatory, arbitrary, and goes against the purpose of Article 15(3) of the Constitution, which gives Parliament the authority to make specific provisions for women and children. 
• In actuality, the girl child is severely disadvantaged by the statute book's adoption of Exception 2 to Section 375 of the IPC, which runs counter to the idealistic and helpful tenets of Article 15(3) of the Constitution.

Arguments on behalf of the Respondent

• The defendants made the following claims against the counsel for the petitioner: that the nation's educational and economic advancements are poor and not improving. They decided to maintain the age of 15 years old, as stated in Exception 2 to Section 375 of the IPC, in order to safeguard the rights of husband and wife in making sexual acts between them illegal. 
• According to the third report of the National Health Survey, 46% of women are younger than 18. It is estimated that there are 23 million child brides in India. Therefore, it would be completely incorrect and unreasonable to criminalize marriage consummation and link it to such a horrible and awful crime as rape. Since child marriage has long been a widespread practice that is founded on cultural norms, fundamental facts, and tradition, it would be incorrect to punish it under Exception 2 to Section 375 of the IPC given India's socioeconomic circumstances. 
• The Law Commission of India (LCI) suggested in its 172nd Report that the wife's age be raised to sixteen degrees. However, after lengthy discussions with numerous stakeholders, this idea was dropped. If the marriage was consummated at the age of 15, the spouse shouldn't be found guilty of rape only because it was customary. 
• The 15-year limit ought to stay under Exception 2 to Section 375 of the IPC since it is necessary for legislation to be created in conformity with standards that do not adversely affect a specific class or community while taking historical and social customs and norms into consideration. Citing the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of minors) Act, 2015, it was said that the Constitution offers redress for minors under the age of eighteen who are in imminent danger. It is crucial to comprehend whether a law is arbitrary before judging whether or not Exception 2 to Section 375 of the IPC is arbitrary.

JUDGMENT

In its ruling, the Supreme Court ruled that having sex with a girl under the age of eighteen, even if you were married, constituted rape. The court went on to explain that the exception in Section 375 of the IPC violated the fundamental rights of girl children by establishing an arbitrary and unreasonable division between married and unmarried girls. It then made the point that, despite the PCMA's continued prohibition on child marriage, millions of girls are still victims of child marriage in India. The decision further aligned the IPC with the POCSO Act, which makes sexual contact with a girl under the age of eighteen illegal, regardless of whether the girl is married or not.  When the wife was under eighteen, the court ruled that Exception 2 of Section 375 IPC was unlawful. Thus, this historic ruling addressed a significant legal loophole in the Indian legal system by making marital rape of young girls a crime. The court made it clear that the subject of marital rape for women over the age of 18 was not at issue in this instance. Hence, the verdict did not apply to adult women.  The court acknowledged during the announcement of this historic ruling that child marriages still occur and that millions of girls continue to suffer as a result of early marriage and pregnancy. Child marriage has persisted in spite of the PCMA's criminalizing measures. Therefore, the ruling also called for the strong enforcement of child protection legislation, urging the federal government and state governments to take additional proactive measures to curb the threat of child marriage and shield vulnerable children from sexual exploitation. Although progressive, this verdict also signaled the need for additional, more structural reforms, including improved PCMA administration, increased social assistance, care for child brides, and a broader conversation about marital rape for adult women.  By criminalizing the rape of minor wives and establishing that marriage does not create protection for such crimes, the Supreme Court effectively closed a significant legal loophole. The problem of adult female marital rape is still unresolved, and there are many different approaches to defending women's rights in India. Discussions about the wider change required to guarantee gender equality and safeguard women's rights in marriages with individuals of any age have increased as a result of this ruling.

CONCLUSION

Marital rape is not recognized in India. In essence, marital rape is when a husband engages in violent sexual activity with his wife without her consent. The current case was the first to acknowledge this.  The Court ruled that Section 375's Exception-2 violated Article 14 of the Indian Constitution because it failed to establish a legitimate classification. Additionally, it was noted that Exception 2 blatantly violated Article 21's guarantee of the right to live a dignified life with a minimum level of autonomy and safety. The court further pointed out that the Section 375 exception was inconsistent with the Juvenile Justice Act or POCSO, which declares anyone under 18 to be a child. Permitting the current exception-2 to Section 375 has the effect of permitting a husband to engage in non-consensual sexual relations with a wife who is between the ages of 15 and 18. In order to reconcile Exception-2 with the main clause, the court decided that Exception-2 should be interpreted to mean that having sex with a wife who is older than 18 is not considered rape. In light of Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, the court ruled that a woman's right to life encompasses her ability to grow up to be a self-sufficient, independent adult who is cognitively, physically, and financially capable. It went on to say that permitting such a provision would have a detrimental effect on the female child's physical and mental health, which would ultimately have serious consequences.  The present case was a first step towards the legal acknowledgment of marital rape in India, which is currently not recognized. Marital rape has been partially criminalized in this case, meaning that it is punishable up until the age of 18 but not beyond. The Court made the exemption in accordance with the POCSO and Juvenile Justice Act, as well as the main provision, by using the norm of harmonious construction. Instead of ruling that the entire exemption is unconstitutional, the court interpreted it in a way that settles the dispute. This case is historic and a step forward in the transformation of Indian society.