CASE BRIEF: RATTAN LAL V. STATE OF PUNJAB, AIR 1965 SC 444

 

CASE NAME	Rattan Lal v. State of Punjab,  AIR 1965 SC 444
CITATION	AIR 1965 SC 444, 1964 7 SCR 676, 1965 MADLJ(CRI) 374, 1964 SCD 914
COURT	The Supreme Court of India.
BENCH	Hon’ble Justice K. C. Dasgupta, Justice Raghubar Dayal, Justice K. Subharao
PETITIONERS	Rattan Lal
RESPONDENT	State of Punjab
DECIDED ON	decided on 10th April, 1964

INTRODUCTION

In the case of Calder v. Bull, the US Apex Court established the definition of an ex-post-facto law as any law that criminalizes someone for committing an offense that was not illegal at the time the act was committed or that imposes penalties that are significantly greater than the offense. This case served as the precedent for ex-post-facto laws. Furthermore, B.R. Ambedkar and B.N. Rao, our writers of the Constitution, undoubtedly had the US provisions in mind when they drafted Article 20 of the document. The law is widely used and recognized not just in the United States and India but also by the European Convention on Human Rights, the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)—Article 15(1)—and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights—Article 11 in paragraph 2. Collectively, these three organizations have maintained that no one who commits an offense should be penalized by the law if the offense was not prohibited at the time it was committed.  The main case that established the rule of beneficial interpretation was "Rattan Lal v. State of Punjab." In this instance, the court clarified that the regulation only lessens the punishment and sentence meted out to the guilty. For example, in the event that a person is sentenced to two years in prison and subsequently a new law is passed reducing the sentence to one year, the accused will only be punished with one year in jail. It essentially states that the offender will be subject to the new legislation's retrospective principle and that he is entitled to all of the remedies provided by the amended law. The Indian Constitution's Article 20(1) makes reference to this regulation. Ex-post facto legislation has been a major feature of Indian Legislatures. In addition to these examples, the paper will examine a number of other cases in which the courts have expressed opinions regarding the benefits and drawbacks of having such legislation in place. 

FACTS OF THE CASE

The appellant, a resident of Palwal in the Gurgaon District, attempted to offend a 7-year-old girl's modesty by trespassing into her home. He was summoned to stand trial before Magistrate Palwal, First Class. On May 31, 1962, the aforementioned Magistrate found him guilty of violating sections 451 and 354 of the Indian Penal Code. He was given a harsh six-month prison sentence for each offense, with the order that the sentences be served consecutively. In addition, he fined the appellant Rs. 200/-under Section 451 of the Indian Penal Code and directed that he be imprisoned for two months without being able to pay the punishment. When the appellant was found guilty, he was sixteen years old.  Since the Act was extended to the Gurgaon District on September 1, 1962, the Magistrate did not have the authority or responsibility to issue any orders under the Act at the time the appellant was found guilty. The appellant filed an appeal with the Additional Sessions Judge, Gurgaon, challenging his conviction and sentencing. The judge denied the case in a September 22, 1962, ruling. Although the aforementioned Act had become operative by the time the Additional Sessions Judge decided the appeal, neither the appellant nor the learned Additional Sessions Judge made use of the Act's provisions. On September 27, 1962, the High Court dismissed the revision that the appellant had submitted. The revision petition was denied in limine, although it did not provide any justification for the Additional Sessions Judge's actions under section 6 of the Act. The appellant appears to have filed Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 793 of 1962 after the revision petition was resolved, asking the High Court to exercise its authority under s. 1 of the Act and to issue orders under ss. 3, 4, or 6. The aforementioned application was likewise denied. 

ISSUES RAISED

• Does the Appellate Court have jurisdiction to exercise its powers under Sec. 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (Act, No. 20 of 1958)?
• Will the accused be liable under the Act, and does the Act have a retrospective effect?

ARGUMENTS FROM BOTH SIDES

Argument from the side of the appellant

• In light of the case's stated circumstances, the appellant should not have been sent to prison but rather released on probation for good behavior under Section 11 of the Act by the High Court. 

Argument from the side of the respondent

• The respondent contends that as the appellant was found guilty prior to the Act's implementation in Gurgaon District, the Act is not retroactive in nature and will not apply to him. 
• Furthermore, he argues that, given the precise wording employed in the Act, neither Section II nor Section 6 of the Act may be applied to the facts of the current case. 
• In any case, he asserts that the appellant is barred by his default from bringing up this argument at this extremely late date because he did not bring it up until after the High Court dismissed the revision petition. 
• Retrospective application of the Act is not recommended since it would impact an individual's criminal responsibility for actions they took prior to the Act's implementation. Several cases addressing the issue of a statute's retroactivity in relation to vested rights have been referenced to bolster this claim. Any law that diminishes or eliminates a vested right does so retroactively. All ex post facto laws are inherently retroactive. 

JUDGMENT

The court decided that the High Court's order should be overturned and that it should be instructed to issue an order in accordance with Section 6 or, if it so chooses, to return the case to the Sessions Court for that purpose. While it is true that this court typically declines to enable a party to present their case for the first time, in this instance, the High Court and the Additional Sessions Judge disregarded the Act's requirements.While it is true that the appellant did not bring the Act's requirements to the court's attention until after the revision petition was decided, this does not excuse the court from carrying out its Act-mandated obligations. By using the authority granted by Section 11 of the Act, the appellate court on appeal or the High Court on revision may issue an order pursuant to Section 6(1).

CONCLUSION

The Act is a turning point in the development of the contemporary liberal tendency of penology reform. It is the outcome of the idea that the goal of criminal law is not so much to punish the particular offender as it is to reform him. The Act makes a distinction between individuals who commit crimes below the age of 21 and those who do not, as well as between those who conduct crimes that carry a life sentence or the possibility of death and those who commit less serious crimes. While the court has complete discretion to release offenders over the age of 21 after admonition or on probation for good behavior, in the case of offenders under 21, the court is granted an injunction prohibiting the court from sentencing them to prison until it is satisfied that, given the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the offense and the character of the offenders, it is not desirable to deal with them under sections 3 and 4 of the Act.  Any court with the authority to try and sentence the offender to jail, as well as the High Court or any other court when a case is brought before it on appeal or for revision, may issue an order under Section 11(1) of the Act. The subsection does not, on its face, limit an appeal court's ability to issue an order under the Act just in situations in which the trial court could have issued one. The wording employed therein is sufficiently broad to permit the appellate court or High Court to issue such an order in the event that the matter comes before it. It was intentionally made broad because the Act's goal was to carry out social reform. There is no reason why the legislature should have prohibited the exercise of such a power, even if the accused had a pending case at some point in the tribunal hierarchy, given that the Act merely introduces a provision to reform the offender rather than altering the terms of the sentence. Section 6(1) uses the term "court" to refer to both revisional and appellate courts. However, there were some criticisms of this Act, which were observed in this case by the dissenting judges. This case is an excellent example of the jurisdictional challenge of the court. The case examines Sec. 6 of the Act and further examines Sec. 2 and Sec. 3 of the Act.